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etaphors shape understanding of the narrative of events (Reinhart, etaphors shape understanding of the narrative of events (Reinhart, 2009) . For example, the received wisdom in the years following the Great 2009) . For example, the received wisdom in the years following the Great Crash of 1929 and the attendant crushing economic contraction was that Crash of 1929 and the attendant crushing economic contraction was that it had resulted from excesses of speculation and competition. Some of the policy it had resulted from excesses of speculation and competition. Some of the policy lessons drawn in the 1930s were that cartelization of industry could promote growth, lessons drawn in the 1930s were that cartelization of industry could promote growth, that restrictions on fi nancial fi rms and transactions in the fi nancial sector were a that restrictions on fi nancial fi rms and transactions in the fi nancial sector were a preferred way to dampen volatility, that fl exible exchange rates were destabilizing, preferred way to dampen volatility, that fl exible exchange rates were destabilizing, and that fi scal policy could stimulate expansion. It took decades for the economics and that fi scal policy could stimulate expansion. It took decades for the economics profession to revise this narrative, beginning with the efforts of Friedman and profession to revise this narrative, beginning with the efforts of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , to put the effect of the supply of money and credit at the center Schwartz (1963) , to put the effect of the supply of money and credit at the center of the story of the Depression. It took longer still to pare back the institutional of the story of the Depression. It took longer still to pare back the institutional edifi ce of banking and fi nancial regulation erected as a consequence of the initial edifi ce of banking and fi nancial regulation erected as a consequence of the initial misreading of the events of the 1920s and 1930s. misreading of the events of the 1920s and 1930s.
In this paper, I argue that the evolving narrative of the events of 2008 repre-In this paper, I argue that the evolving narrative of the events of 2008 represents a similar error in our understanding. The current metaphor seems to be that sents a similar error in our understanding. The current metaphor seems to be that the global economy was hit by a "perfect storm" of disruptive forces late in 2008. A the global economy was hit by a "perfect storm" of disruptive forces late in 2008. A prime-time example of this interpretation came in a nationally televised broadcast prime-time example of this interpretation came in a nationally televised broadcast in July 2009, when Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke answered questions in July 2009, when Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke answered questions about the economy and monetary policy in a town-hall format. Interspersed with about the economy and monetary policy in a town-hall format. Interspersed with emphasize that the same model also suggests more relevant messages, including emphasize that the same model also suggests more relevant messages, including that the prices creditors expect to receive in the future are critical in determining that the prices creditors expect to receive in the future are critical in determining their behavior. their behavior.
The conclusion considers a course not taken in March 2008: that is, prompt The conclusion considers a course not taken in March 2008: that is, prompt recognition of economic losses and forced markdowns. But this policy choice has recognition of economic losses and forced markdowns. But this policy choice has implications that go beyond events at Bear Stearns in March 2008 and Lehman implications that go beyond events at Bear Stearns in March 2008 and Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In Reinhart and Rogoff's (2009) chronicling of the Brothers in September 2008. In Reinhart and Rogoff's (2009) chronicling of the economic crises over the past eight centuries, one theme is that while countries economic crises over the past eight centuries, one theme is that while countries and crises differ considerably, no country has avoided fi nancial crisis. This univer-and crises differ considerably, no country has avoided fi nancial crisis. This universality suggests that fi nancial crises will recur, despite the promises of legislation sality suggests that fi nancial crises will recur, despite the promises of legislation and enlightened oversight. If fi nancial crises will be ever with us, it is important and enlightened oversight. If fi nancial crises will be ever with us, it is important to have a strategy concerning how they will be managed. Among the areas where to have a strategy concerning how they will be managed. Among the areas where progress can be made is in identifying the inherent tensions and uncertainties progress can be made is in identifying the inherent tensions and uncertainties that hinder decision making (for example, Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven, that hinder decision making (for example, Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven, 2005 , offer a systematic effort to learn lessons). Thus, I will discuss why the path 2005, offer a systematic effort to learn lessons). Thus, I will discuss why the path of recognizing losses and forced markdowns might not have been taken in March of recognizing losses and forced markdowns might not have been taken in March 2008 and describe the biases inherent in crisis management that make similar 2008 and describe the biases inherent in crisis management that make similar mistakes likely in the future. mistakes likely in the future.
Context Context How the Financial Crisis Unfolded How the Financial Crisis Unfolded
The housing market in the United States had a remarkable run in the years The housing market in the United States had a remarkable run in the years before the fi nancial crisis. The rise in house prices and step-up of construction before the fi nancial crisis. The rise in house prices and step-up of construction activity started around 1992 at a time when the Federal Reserve was holding its activity started around 1992 at a time when the Federal Reserve was holding its policy interest rate at an unusually low level by the standards of the past few decades. policy interest rate at an unusually low level by the standards of the past few decades. The good times lasted until 2005, when monetary policy was tightening after The good times lasted until 2005, when monetary policy was tightening after another spell of low interest rates. Over that period, construction activity contrib-another spell of low interest rates. Over that period, construction activity contributed uted 1 1 / /5 5 percentage points annually to the growth rate of real GDP, and the share percentage points annually to the growth rate of real GDP, and the share of employment in construction and fi nance, out of the total workforce, rose from of employment in construction and fi nance, out of the total workforce, rose from 10¼ percent to 11¾ percent. That is, over this period, of the 27.4 million people 10¼ percent to 11¾ percent. That is, over this period, of the 27.4 million people added to work rolls (which ended 2006 with a total of 136 million), 4.8 million were added to work rolls (which ended 2006 with a total of 136 million), 4.8 million were directly related to construction and fi nance. By the end of the episode, the nation directly related to construction and fi nance. By the end of the episode, the nation was left with an excess stock of housing, and the heady rates of appreciation in was left with an excess stock of housing, and the heady rates of appreciation in home prices petered out. House price indexes peaked in late 2006. A contraction home prices petered out. House price indexes peaked in late 2006. A contraction in construction transpired to wind down the inventory overhang, which is often a in construction transpired to wind down the inventory overhang, which is often a feature of economic slowdowns and recessions. feature of economic slowdowns and recessions.
The breathtaking surprise of the correction, however, was the extent to which The breathtaking surprise of the correction, however, was the extent to which fi nancial markets and institutions became entangled. In June 2007, the investment fi nancial markets and institutions became entangled. In June 2007, the investment bank Bear Stearns admitted that two of the hedge funds it had sponsored were bank Bear Stearns admitted that two of the hedge funds it had sponsored were under considerable funding strains associated with their holdings of complicated under considerable funding strains associated with their holdings of complicated mortgage-related securities (a selective timeline of signifi cant events of the fi nancial mortgage-related securities (a selective timeline of signifi cant events of the fi nancial crisis is provided in Table 1 ). crisis is provided in Table 1 ). 1 1 By early August 2007, the market for these securities By early August 2007, the market for these securities was no longer functioning effectively. The Federal Reserve began actions to support was no longer functioning effectively. The Federal Reserve began actions to support the economy as a whole through reductions in the federal funds interest rate as the economy as a whole through reductions in the federal funds interest rate as well as the more targeted interventions of creating different lending facilities to well as the more targeted interventions of creating different lending facilities to make credit more broadly available both to banks and to other major players in the make credit more broadly available both to banks and to other major players in the fi nancial industry. Bear Stearns ceased to exist in March 2008 after a government-fi nancial industry. Bear Stearns ceased to exist in March 2008 after a governmentassisted sale that was backstopped by a $30 billion loan from the Federal Reserve. assisted sale that was backstopped by a $30 billion loan from the Federal Reserve. Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in September 2008, and what had up to that Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in September 2008, and what had up to that point looked like a fairly mild recession became a wrenching downturn based on a point looked like a fairly mild recession became a wrenching downturn based on a contraction in credit, destruction of wealth, a rise in yields on risky instruments, and contraction in credit, destruction of wealth, a rise in yields on risky instruments, and deterioration in confi dence. deterioration in confi dence.
The economic downturn was remarkable in many aspects. In Reinhart and The economic downturn was remarkable in many aspects. In Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) , Carmen Reinhart and I emphasize the global shutdown in exports, Reinhart (2009) , Carmen Reinhart and I emphasize the global shutdown in exports, but the experience stands out domestically as well. In 2008, U.S. households suffered but the experience stands out domestically as well. In 2008, U.S. households suffered the worst one-year decline in household net worth relative to income in a century the worst one-year decline in household net worth relative to income in a century of recordkeeping-an amount equal to about a year of nominal GDP in that year. of recordkeeping-an amount equal to about a year of nominal GDP in that year. 2 2 The wealth-to-income ratio in 2006 was about 3½; thus, a fall in wealth equal to The wealth-to-income ratio in 2006 was about 3½; thus, a fall in wealth equal to income produced a one-quarter drop in that ratio relative to the initial level. For income produced a one-quarter drop in that ratio relative to the initial level. For comparison, the bursting of the tech-stock bubble in 2001-2002 caused net worth comparison, the bursting of the tech-stock bubble in 2001-2002 caused net worth to contract 7 percent in real terms. to contract 7 percent in real terms.
Comparisons of the tech bubble that burst around the time of the 2001 reces-Comparisons of the tech bubble that burst around the time of the 2001 recession and the housing bubble that burst around the time of the 2007-2009 recession sion and the housing bubble that burst around the time of the 2007-2009 recession raise a conundrum. Both seemed to stem from speculative excesses. The fi rst raise a conundrum. Both seemed to stem from speculative excesses. The fi rst involved overvaluation of corporate equities, which amounted to one-quarter of involved overvaluation of corporate equities, which amounted to one-quarter of household net worth in 2000 (that is, corporate equities were about $10.9 trillion household net worth in 2000 (that is, corporate equities were about $10.9 trillion of household net worth of $42.7 trillion in 2000). The second involved overvalu-of household net worth of $42.7 trillion in 2000). The second involved overvaluation of housing, about one-third of net worth in 2006 (that is, real estate was ation of housing, about one-third of net worth in 2006 (that is, real estate was $25.2 trillion of household net worth in 2006 out of a total of $64.4 trillion). Both $25.2 trillion of household net worth in 2006 out of a total of $64.4 trillion). Both corporate equities and real estate fell about 30 percent in the reckoning. (These corporate equities and real estate fell about 30 percent in the reckoning. (These data are available from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts, June 2010, data are available from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts, June 2010, Table B .100.) As housing is a larger share of household wealth than equities, the Table B .100.) As housing is a larger share of household wealth than equities, the residential building bust would have presumably created the larger shock wave. In residential building bust would have presumably created the larger shock wave. In the 2000-2002 episode, other wealth gains offset much of the equity crash; specifi -the 2000-2002 episode, other wealth gains offset much of the equity crash; specifically, a rising tide of real estate values washed over much of the equity crash. In cally, a rising tide of real estate values washed over much of the equity crash. In the latter one, both housing and equity prices declined, and so losses across the the latter one, both housing and equity prices declined, and so losses across the balance sheet were reinforcing. balance sheet were reinforcing.
Central to the economic distress of the 2007-2009 recession is that fi nancial Central to the economic distress of the 2007-2009 recession is that fi nancial markets amplifi ed the initiating economic shock, rather than damping it as would markets amplifi ed the initiating economic shock, rather than damping it as would be expected if fi nancial instruments had hedging and risk-sharing attributes. Part of be expected if fi nancial instruments had hedging and risk-sharing attributes. Part of TARP is signed into legislation 10/8/08 AIG Treasury restructures bailout of AIG, providing $37.8 billion more in credit 10/14/08
Paulson anounces a program to invest up to $250 billion in banks 11/10/08 AIG Treasury announces it will invest $40 billion in AIG 11/12/08 Treasury announces that it will not buy troubled assets, but inject capital 12/19/08 GM and Chrysler Treasury announces 3-month loans to GM and Chrysler in order to prevent bankruptcy 1/15/09
Second half of TARP funding is released 2/25/09
The Treasury begins its stress tests of fi nancial institutions 3/19/09 Auto industry
The Treasury announces plan to provide $5 billion in loans to auto parts companies 3/23/09
The Treasury announces a plan to encourage purchases of troubled assets 4/30/09 Chrysler Chrysler fi les for bankruptcy protection and the Treasury agrees to provide $8 billion in loans 5/7/09
Stress tests are completed 6/1/09 GM GM fi les bankruptcy and the Treasury agrees to provide $30.1 billion 6/9/09 10 banks are approved to repay funds to the TARP fund. the explanation no doubt lies in the complexity of the instruments using residential the explanation no doubt lies in the complexity of the instruments using residential mortgages as collateral and the opaqueness and leverage of the balance sheets of mortgages as collateral and the opaqueness and leverage of the balance sheets of many intermediaries that held them. But part of the reason that fi nancial markets many intermediaries that held them. But part of the reason that fi nancial markets amplifi ed the negative economic shock from the bursting of the housing bubble amplifi ed the negative economic shock from the bursting of the housing bubble lies in the policy response: in particular, the change in direction from aggressively lies in the policy response: in particular, the change in direction from aggressively intervening to save Bear Stearns and then six months later not intervening to save intervening to save Bear Stearns and then six months later not intervening to save Lehman Brothers. Lehman Brothers.
The Bear Stearns Intervention The Bear Stearns Intervention
Bear Stearns was an intermediate-sized investment bank, particularly active Bear Stearns was an intermediate-sized investment bank, particularly active in the market for fi xed-income securities. It was an important underwriter of in the market for fi xed-income securities. It was an important underwriter of mortgage-related securities, a market maker in secondary trading, and a sponsor mortgage-related securities, a market maker in secondary trading, and a sponsor of various investment vehicles. Those activities were related. As an underwriter of of various investment vehicles. Those activities were related. As an underwriter of fi xed-income securities, Bear Stearns pooled mortgages together and issued securi-fi xed-income securities, Bear Stearns pooled mortgages together and issued securities using them as collateral. By the mid-2000s, the stream of income from those ties using them as collateral. By the mid-2000s, the stream of income from those mortgage-backed securities was split up into more senior and more junior claims, mortgage-backed securities was split up into more senior and more junior claims, in which those holding the most junior claims would experience any losses fi rst, in which those holding the most junior claims would experience any losses fi rst, thereby providing some protection to those holding more senior claims. Because thereby providing some protection to those holding more senior claims. Because the senior claims appeared to be safe, they were held by banks and others looking the senior claims appeared to be safe, they were held by banks and others looking for extremely safe assets. Indeed, international bank regulations (specifi cally the for extremely safe assets. Indeed, international bank regulations (specifi cally the Basel II accords) were such that if those lower-risk tranches received a triple-A stamp Basel II accords) were such that if those lower-risk tranches received a triple-A stamp from an accredited rating agency, then a commercial bank could hold them and from an accredited rating agency, then a commercial bank could hold them and only have to set aside a small amount of capital. only have to set aside a small amount of capital.
The high-risk portions of these securities representing more junior claims were The high-risk portions of these securities representing more junior claims were more diffi cult to sell. In some cases, sponsoring an investment vehicle was a mecha-more diffi cult to sell. In some cases, sponsoring an investment vehicle was a mechanism to move those illiquid assets off the balance sheet. But in many cases they were nism to move those illiquid assets off the balance sheet. But in many cases they were retained on the balance sheet. retained on the balance sheet. Growth was especially large in "Total fi nancial instruments owned, at fair value" and Growth was especially large in "Total fi nancial instruments owned, at fair value" and in "Assets of variable interest entities and mortgage loan special purpose entities." in "Assets of variable interest entities and mortgage loan special purpose entities." Given what seemed at the time to be a low level of money market interest rates Given what seemed at the time to be a low level of money market interest rates (with the overnight federal funds rate at 5¼ percent), the management of Bear (with the overnight federal funds rate at 5¼ percent), the management of Bear Stearns chose to fund its positions at short-term maturities. Thus, the liabilities show Stearns chose to fund its positions at short-term maturities. Thus, the liabilities show a large gain in short-term borrowing under "Securities sold under agreements to a large gain in short-term borrowing under "Securities sold under agreements to repurchase." Bear Stearns' capital buffer, which is the "Stockholders' Equity" shown repurchase." Bear Stearns' capital buffer, which is the "Stockholders' Equity" shown in the bottom row, did not grow commensurately with its balance sheet. By the end in the bottom row, did not grow commensurately with its balance sheet. By the end of 2007, Bear Stearns was leveraged at 35 to 1. of 2007, Bear Stearns was leveraged at 35 to 1.
As housing prices slid and mortgage delinquency rates rose, market participants As housing prices slid and mortgage delinquency rates rose, market participants became increasingly concerned about fi rms with the business model of borrowing became increasingly concerned about fi rms with the business model of borrowing short term to fund illiquid long-term mortgage-related assets. In January 2008, the short term to fund illiquid long-term mortgage-related assets. In January 2008, the large thrift Countrywide Financial was bought by Bank of America at what then was large thrift Countrywide Financial was bought by Bank of America at what then was thought to be a bargain price. By February 2008, the British trust Northern Rock thought to be a bargain price. By February 2008, the British trust Northern Rock experienced a deposit run and was taken over by the U.K. government (as described experienced a deposit run and was taken over by the U.K. government (as described in this journal by Shin, 2009) . in this journal by Shin, 2009) . The ability of Bear Stearns to roll over its short-term debt proved increasingly The ability of Bear Stearns to roll over its short-term debt proved increasingly unsupportable as creditors became less tolerant of risk. Faced with a funding run at unsupportable as creditors became less tolerant of risk. Faced with a funding run at Bear, fi nancial authorities sought a strong partner to assume the fi rm's obligations. Bear, fi nancial authorities sought a strong partner to assume the fi rm's obligations. After some negotiation, that partner turned out to be JPMorgan Chase (JPMC), After some negotiation, that partner turned out to be JPMorgan Chase (JPMC), a $1.3 trillion fi nancial holding company. a $1.3 trillion fi nancial holding company. 3 3 Worried by the weakness of the Bear Worried by the weakness of the Bear Stearns portfolio, JPMC's management only agreed to acquire the failing fi rm if Stearns portfolio, JPMC's management only agreed to acquire the failing fi rm if $30 billion of assets were lifted from its portfolio. $30 billion of assets were lifted from its portfolio.
Bear Stearns was a nondepository institution. Thus, it was outside the purview Bear Stearns was a nondepository institution. Thus, it was outside the purview of the usual vehicles to facilitate its resolution, like the Federal Deposit Insur-of the usual vehicles to facilitate its resolution, like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve. Neither the U.S. Treasury nor ance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve. Neither the U.S. Treasury nor the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had funds appropriated by the the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had funds appropriated by the Congress at hand that could be used for resolving a nondepository institution. Only Congress at hand that could be used for resolving a nondepository institution. Only one entity was poised to step into the policy void: the Federal Reserve. one entity was poised to step into the policy void: the Federal Reserve.
As the nation's central bank, the Federal Reserve had, through an uneven and As the nation's central bank, the Federal Reserve had, through an uneven and uncertain process, achieved a measure of independence from the rest of the govern-uncertain process, achieved a measure of independence from the rest of the government over the years (Meltzer, 2003) . The Fed's balance sheet is separated from ment over the years (Meltzer, 2003) . The Fed's balance sheet is separated from the federal budget: the Fed does not rely on authorized outlays, but rather funds the federal budget: the Fed does not rely on authorized outlays, but rather funds itself from seigniorage and turns over any surplus to the Treasury. Decisions on the itself from seigniorage and turns over any surplus to the Treasury. Decisions on the Fed's portfolio are its own, subject to limitations in the Federal Reserve Act. This Fed's portfolio are its own, subject to limitations in the Federal Reserve Act. This independence had been won gradually as politicians learned that it would produce independence had been won gradually as politicians learned that it would produce better monetary policy and commensurate economic outcomes. The structure that better monetary policy and commensurate economic outcomes. The structure that provided independence in monetary policy, however, also allowed fi nancial authori-provided independence in monetary policy, however, also allowed fi nancial authorities room to improvise in a crisis. ties room to improvise in a crisis.
On March 14, 2008, $30 billion of securities were removed from Bear Stearns' On March 14, 2008, $30 billion of securities were removed from Bear Stearns' portfolio in a purchase that was legally structured as a discount loan from the portfolio in a purchase that was legally structured as a discount loan from the Federal Reserve. As Bear Stearns was not a depository, the loan was made under Federal Reserve. As Bear Stearns was not a depository, the loan was made under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which empowers Federal Reserve lending Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which empowers Federal Reserve lending to individuals, partnerships, and corporations provided that a supermajority of the to individuals, partnerships, and corporations provided that a supermajority of the Fed's Board of Governors determines that "unusual and exigent conditions" exist Fed's Board of Governors determines that "unusual and exigent conditions" exist and the reserve banks hold that credit is not available from the private sector. JPMC and the reserve banks hold that credit is not available from the private sector. JPMC did provide a measure of credit protection by pledging to absorb the fi rst $1 billion did provide a measure of credit protection by pledging to absorb the fi rst $1 billion of losses on the portfolio. of losses on the portfolio.
The loan to purchase Bear Stearns assets was unique in several respects. It was The loan to purchase Bear Stearns assets was unique in several respects. It was made under the explicit authority of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, over-made under the explicit authority of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, overriding the Fed Board's own Regulation A, which had been previously promulgated riding the Fed Board's own Regulation A, which had been previously promulgated to govern such lending. This change in policy allowed the loan to be structured as a to govern such lending. This change in policy allowed the loan to be structured as a discount (in which the Fed acquired securities at a marked-down price at the outset discount (in which the Fed acquired securities at a marked-down price at the outset as repayment of the loan) rather than a traditional advance (in which the securities as repayment of the loan) rather than a traditional advance (in which the securities served as collateral and would be repaid on the return of funds). In other words, the served as collateral and would be repaid on the return of funds). In other words, the loans were made without recourse. This implies that any losses on those securities loans were made without recourse. This implies that any losses on those securities would accrue to the Fed, giving it the economic equivalent of an ownership interest would accrue to the Fed, giving it the economic equivalent of an ownership interest in these securities. In Wessel's (2009, p. 168 ) nice turn of phrase, "To satisfy Fed in these securities. In Wessel's (2009, p. 168 ) nice turn of phrase, "To satisfy Fed lawyers, the Fed subsidy was cast in the rhetoric of a loan." To hold securities that it lawyers, the Fed subsidy was cast in the rhetoric of a loan." To hold securities that it otherwise could not legally own, the Fed had to create an off-balance-sheet entity, otherwise could not legally own, the Fed had to create an off-balance-sheet entity, the special investment vehicle "Maiden Lane," apparently so named because it was the special investment vehicle "Maiden Lane," apparently so named because it was the back-door access to the main building of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. the back-door access to the main building of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In addition, the rate charged on the loan was below that previously specifi ed under In addition, the rate charged on the loan was below that previously specifi ed under Regulation A. Regulation A.
Financial authorities like Bernanke (2008a) and Geithner (2008) justifi ed this Financial authorities like Bernanke (2008a) and Geithner (2008) justifi ed this action on a variety of grounds. First, Bear Stearns had a large, opaque, and compli-action on a variety of grounds. First, Bear Stearns had a large, opaque, and complicated balance sheet. This situation implied that if Bear entered bankruptcy, many cated balance sheet. This situation implied that if Bear entered bankruptcy, many counterparties might be hurt, and that the scale and scope of the fall-out was uncer-counterparties might be hurt, and that the scale and scope of the fall-out was uncertain. Second, Bear Stearns provided important brokering and clearing services to tain. Second, Bear Stearns provided important brokering and clearing services to the fi nancial industry (including what was known as "prime brokerage" to hedge the fi nancial industry (including what was known as "prime brokerage" to hedge funds), and these utility-like functions might be impaired in a disorderly closure of funds), and these utility-like functions might be impaired in a disorderly closure of the fi rm. Third, at a time when fi nancial markets were strained and capital was being the fi rm. Third, at a time when fi nancial markets were strained and capital was being withdrawn from trading, a further blow to confi dence might topple many other withdrawn from trading, a further blow to confi dence might topple many other dominoes. Fourth, it was claimed that the assets acquired from Bear Stearns by the dominoes. Fourth, it was claimed that the assets acquired from Bear Stearns by the Federal Reserve were temporarily undervalued by irrational investor fl ight toward Federal Reserve were temporarily undervalued by irrational investor fl ight toward safe assets. As markets returned to a more proper footing, the Maiden Lane vehicle safe assets. As markets returned to a more proper footing, the Maiden Lane vehicle should turn a profi t. Thus, intervention could be justifi ed as following Bagehot's should turn a profi t. Thus, intervention could be justifi ed as following Bagehot's (1873) dictum of lending on good collateral, and could be validated by eventual (1873) dictum of lending on good collateral, and could be validated by eventual profi ts in the Maiden Lane portfolio, thereby meeting the standard for stabilizing profi ts in the Maiden Lane portfolio, thereby meeting the standard for stabilizing intervention as put forth by Friedman (1953) . intervention as put forth by Friedman (1953) .
But regardless of the rationale given, the U.S. government had widened the But regardless of the rationale given, the U.S. government had widened the perimeter of its safety net for systemically important fi nancial institutions to include perimeter of its safety net for systemically important fi nancial institutions to include a mid-sized investment bank. Bear Stearns shareholders suffered, but the Fed struc-a mid-sized investment bank. Bear Stearns shareholders suffered, but the Fed structured the JPMC purchase so that it protected all creditors, insured and uninsured tured the JPMC purchase so that it protected all creditors, insured and uninsured and including some of the most sophisticated fi nancial fi rms on Earth. The federal and including some of the most sophisticated fi nancial fi rms on Earth. The federal government also showed a willingness to act quickly. The rationale for a prompt government also showed a willingness to act quickly. The rationale for a prompt response was that uncertainty about U.S. institutions would be especially damaging response was that uncertainty about U.S. institutions would be especially damaging in foreign fi nancial markets. In his memoirs, then-Treasury Secretary Paulson (2010) in foreign fi nancial markets. In his memoirs, then-Treasury Secretary Paulson (2010) expresses a worry about acting "before Asian markets open" four separate times. expresses a worry about acting "before Asian markets open" four separate times.
Prelude, not Coda Prelude, not Coda
At the time, the unusual actions associated with the Bear Stearns resolution At the time, the unusual actions associated with the Bear Stearns resolution were mostly well received in the media and by elected offi cials. Equity prices rallied were mostly well received in the media and by elected offi cials. Equity prices rallied 9 percent within six weeks after the action. Interest risk spreads, as proxied by the 9 percent within six weeks after the action. Interest risk spreads, as proxied by the rate on three-month Eurodollar deposits less the comparable Treasury bill rate, rate on three-month Eurodollar deposits less the comparable Treasury bill rate, remained wide, suggestive of lingering counterparty concerns. Nor did pressures remained wide, suggestive of lingering counterparty concerns. Nor did pressures on specifi c other fi nancial fi rms let up. on specifi c other fi nancial fi rms let up.
During summer 2008, the two main housing-related government-sponsored During summer 2008, the two main housing-related government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, became the center of market attention. enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, became the center of market attention. 4 4 The housing fi nance twins virtually wrote the script for many fi rms in the residen-The housing fi nance twins virtually wrote the script for many fi rms in the residential mortgage industry. They had considerable, often complicated, exposures to the tial mortgage industry. They had considerable, often complicated, exposures to the U.S. housing sector in their portfolios, fi nanced short-term and with large leverage. U.S. housing sector in their portfolios, fi nanced short-term and with large leverage. According to their annual reports at the end of 2007, the two had combined assets According to their annual reports at the end of 2007, the two had combined assets of $1.6 trillion on a capital base of about $70 billion. Fannie Mae was levered 20 to of $1.6 trillion on a capital base of about $70 billion. Fannie Mae was levered 20 to 1 and Freddie Mac was levered 29 to 1. Unlike purely private fi rms, the government-1 and Freddie Mac was levered 29 to 1. Unlike purely private fi rms, the governmentsponsored enterprises benefi ted from the impression among many investors that sponsored enterprises benefi ted from the impression among many investors that their debt was backstopped by the U.S. Treasury. As concerns about the solvency of their debt was backstopped by the U.S. Treasury. As concerns about the solvency of these fi rms increased, the government made this implicit guarantee explicit with these fi rms increased, the government made this implicit guarantee explicit with the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, signed into law on July 30, 2008. the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, signed into law on July 30, 2008.
The rationale for the law as publicly expressed by fi nancial offi cials was already The rationale for the law as publicly expressed by fi nancial offi cials was already voiced in the Bear Stearns' experience-that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were voiced in the Bear Stearns' experience-that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were subject to liquidity pressures because of the temporary undervaluation of their subject to liquidity pressures because of the temporary undervaluation of their mortgage assets. Thus, public support would reassure investors at what was expected mortgage assets. Thus, public support would reassure investors at what was expected to be no cost to the government. But regardless of such reassurance, the backstop to be no cost to the government. But regardless of such reassurance, the backstop was called upon quickly and, on September 7, 2008, the two government-sponsored was called upon quickly and, on September 7, 2008, the two government-sponsored enterprises were put into government conservatorship. enterprises were put into government conservatorship.
Again, this did not stem market strains. One weekend later, the investment Again, this did not stem market strains. One weekend later, the investment bank Lehman Brothers faced dire funding problems. This time, the government bank Lehman Brothers faced dire funding problems. This time, the government investigated the possibility of brokering another buyout, but in the end, did not offer investigated the possibility of brokering another buyout, but in the end, did not offer support in the form of taking assets off the Lehman balance sheet, and the fi rm fi led support in the form of taking assets off the Lehman balance sheet, and the fi rm fi led for bankruptcy protection on September 16, 2008. Paulson (2010, chap. 7) provides for bankruptcy protection on September 16, 2008. Paulson (2010, chap. 7) provides a useful and accessible rendering of how these events unfolded. a useful and accessible rendering of how these events unfolded.
The rationale given for the Lehman decision evolved over time. For example, The rationale given for the Lehman decision evolved over time. For example, Chairman Bernanke (2008b) told a congressional committee on September 23, Chairman Bernanke (2008b) told a congressional committee on September 23, 2008, that "the troubles at Lehman had been well known for some time and inves-2008, that "the troubles at Lehman had been well known for some time and investors clearly recognized-as evidenced, for example, by the high cost of insuring tors clearly recognized-as evidenced, for example, by the high cost of insuring Lehman's debt in the market for credit default swaps-that the failure of the fi rm Lehman's debt in the market for credit default swaps-that the failure of the fi rm was a signifi cant possibility. Thus, we judged that investors and counterparties had was a signifi cant possibility. Thus, we judged that investors and counterparties had had time to take precautionary measures." In short, this explanation holds that the had time to take precautionary measures." In short, this explanation holds that the Corps of Financial Engineers did not act because they believed fi nancial markets Corps of Financial Engineers did not act because they believed fi nancial markets could absorb the fi rm's failure. The rationale for not acting subsequently switched could absorb the fi rm's failure. The rationale for not acting subsequently switched to the lack of tools. In April 2010, Bernanke (2010) told a congressional committee: to the lack of tools. In April 2010, Bernanke (2010) told a congressional committee: "The Federal Reserve fully understood that the failure of Lehman would shake the "The Federal Reserve fully understood that the failure of Lehman would shake the fi nancial system and the economy. However, the only tool available to the Federal fi nancial system and the economy. However, the only tool available to the Federal Reserve to address the situation was its ability to provide short-term liquidity against Reserve to address the situation was its ability to provide short-term liquidity against adequate collateral." adequate collateral." Whatever the rationale for not acting to save Lehman, when it was allowed to Whatever the rationale for not acting to save Lehman, when it was allowed to fail, market pressures mounted dramatically. The next day, September 16, the insur-fail, market pressures mounted dramatically. The next day, September 16, the insurance giant American International Group (AIG) received massive support from the ance giant American International Group (AIG) received massive support from the Federal Reserve, and would later receive additional funds from the Treasury. As Federal Reserve, and would later receive additional funds from the Treasury. As many large, complex fi nancial institutions faced fi nancial diffi culties, on October 3, many large, complex fi nancial institutions faced fi nancial diffi culties, on October 3, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was signed into law, giving the Secretary the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was signed into law, giving the Secretary of Treasury $700 billion to purchase assets so as to shore up the value of mortgage of Treasury $700 billion to purchase assets so as to shore up the value of mortgage portfolios that were weighing down intermediaries' balance sheets. portfolios that were weighing down intermediaries' balance sheets. 5 5 Not long after Not long after passage, TARP resources were redirected to inject capital directly into fi nancial passage, TARP resources were redirected to inject capital directly into fi nancial institutions. In the end, the U.S. government became a co-owner of some of the institutions. In the end, the U.S. government became a co-owner of some of the largest fi nancial institutions in the country. largest fi nancial institutions in the country.
At this point late in 2008, the deep fi nancial crisis was underway. Over the next At this point late in 2008, the deep fi nancial crisis was underway. Over the next two months into November 2008, major equity indexes dropped 44 percent and two months into November 2008, major equity indexes dropped 44 percent and the risk spreads that had been 230 basis points back at the time of the Bear Stearns the risk spreads that had been 230 basis points back at the time of the Bear Stearns bailout six months earlier blew out beyond 500 basis points. bailout six months earlier blew out beyond 500 basis points.
The Many Implications of a Crisis of Confi dence The Many Implications of a Crisis of Confi dence
The arguments for government intervention during a fi nancial crisis have a The arguments for government intervention during a fi nancial crisis have a common tone. They emphasize that the fi nancial institutions are large and/or common tone. They emphasize that the fi nancial institutions are large and/or highly interconnected. They emphasize that the fi nancial situation is opaque and highly interconnected. They emphasize that the fi nancial situation is opaque and unclear, but that there is a clear risk of a fi nancial run with dire consequences. unclear, but that there is a clear risk of a fi nancial run with dire consequences. They then argue that government assistance will avoid a crisis and provide time They then argue that government assistance will avoid a crisis and provide time for a more gradual adjustment-and even that the government can sometimes for a more gradual adjustment-and even that the government can sometimes turn a profi t as the provider of liquidity in these situations. This line of argument turn a profi t as the provider of liquidity in these situations. This line of argument often cites as its guiding authority Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) seminal explana-often cites as its guiding authority Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) seminal explanation of bank runs (which in turn built on the important work of Bryant, 1980) . tion of bank runs (which in turn built on the important work of Bryant, 1980) . Given the importance of the deservedly famous Diamond and Dybvig model, I will Given the importance of the deservedly famous Diamond and Dybvig model, I will begin here by exploring the most common interpretation of that model. However, begin here by exploring the most common interpretation of that model. However, I will then point out that the complete model is more subtle and can be taken in I will then point out that the complete model is more subtle and can be taken in many different directions (as in Allen and Gale, 2007) . The same model that is many different directions (as in Allen and Gale, 2007) . The same model that is commonly cited as justifi cation for government intervention during a fi nancial commonly cited as justifi cation for government intervention during a fi nancial crisis also provides a framework for understanding the possibility that government crisis also provides a framework for understanding the possibility that government may make critical missteps when it intervenes. may make critical missteps when it intervenes.
Financial Runs and the Role for Government Intervention Financial Runs and the Role for Government Intervention
This Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model explores how a fi nancial interme-This Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model explores how a fi nancial intermediary offering a liquid deposit product but investing in illiquid assets may be diary offering a liquid deposit product but investing in illiquid assets may be subject to sudden withdrawals if it falls into public disfavor. That intuition was subject to sudden withdrawals if it falls into public disfavor. That intuition was also famously spelled out by Bagehot (1873) in also famously spelled out by Bagehot (1873) A key result is that a spontaneous crisis of confi dence could spark a run and that government is that a spontaneous crisis of confi dence could spark a run and that government protection of creditors could avoid such self-fulfi lling and wasteful outcomes. The protection of creditors could avoid such self-fulfi lling and wasteful outcomes. The description of intermediation mismatches and funding runs was used repeatedly description of intermediation mismatches and funding runs was used repeatedly through 2008. Bear Stearns, the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae through 2008. Bear Stearns, the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and AIG all relied on short-term instruments to fi nance illiquid and Freddie Mac, and AIG all relied on short-term instruments to fi nance illiquid obligations. If the market had gotten the prices of those assets temporarily wrong, obligations. If the market had gotten the prices of those assets temporarily wrong, those institutions might be solvent (at fundamental values) but illiquid and those institutions might be solvent (at fundamental values) but illiquid and vulnerable. A related description is that of "fi re sale," that an asset would fetch vulnerable. A related description is that of "fi re sale," that an asset would fetch a price well below its longer-term value because of an unusual volume of sellers a price well below its longer-term value because of an unusual volume of sellers or retreat of purchasers (in part related to the breakdown of credit markets as or retreat of purchasers (in part related to the breakdown of credit markets as described by Krishnamurthy, 2010, in this journal). The description highlights described by Krishnamurthy, 2010, in this journal). The description highlights the fundamental inference problem: Is the asset's value temporarily or perma-the fundamental inference problem: Is the asset's value temporarily or permanently low? If values are temporarily low, government action would seem to be nently low? If values are temporarily low, government action would seem to be potentially justifi ed. potentially justifi ed.
To understand the Diamond-Dybvig framework, consider the example shown To understand the Diamond-Dybvig framework, consider the example shown in Figure 1 . Suppose there are three sets of actors examined in two periods. Capital in Figure 1 . Suppose there are three sets of actors examined in two periods. Capital investors each own a technology that can turn each $1 invested into an expected investors each own a technology that can turn each $1 invested into an expected value of $(1+ value of $(1+r) by the second period. Savers are each willing to set aside $1 on the ) by the second period. Savers are each willing to set aside $1 on the expectation of some return in the second period. The middlemen are intermedi-expectation of some return in the second period. The middlemen are intermediaries that put up a capital stake of aries that put up a capital stake of k, pool the deposits of the many savers, and lend , pool the deposits of the many savers, and lend to the many capital investors. Intermediaries set aside the capital in a safe reserve to the many capital investors. Intermediaries set aside the capital in a safe reserve asset, providing the benefi ts of diversifi cation for the savers and a reserve cushion. asset, providing the benefi ts of diversifi cation for the savers and a reserve cushion. The intermediary earns The intermediary earns p per $1 deposited for this effort. For simplicity of notation, per $1 deposited for this effort. For simplicity of notation, although nothing turns on this assumption, say that the number of savers and inves-although nothing turns on this assumption, say that the number of savers and investors are equal at tors are equal at n and their respective source and need for funds are each $1. The and their respective source and need for funds are each $1. The fi gure outlines these activities scaled to each $1 of deposit, with the fi rst column fi gure outlines these activities scaled to each $1 of deposit, with the fi rst column showing the starting point and the second column showing the hoped-for outcome showing the starting point and the second column showing the hoped-for outcome for each participant. for each participant.
The investment technology and the deposit contract set the wheels of this model The investment technology and the deposit contract set the wheels of this model in motion. First, once the capital project is started, it can only be stopped prema-in motion. First, once the capital project is started, it can only be stopped prematurely at a loss. A project halted before completion-that is, in the gap between the turely at a loss. A project halted before completion-that is, in the gap between the two columns-returns $(1 -two columns-returns $ (1 -w) . Another way to think about the intuition behind ). Another way to think about the intuition behind this assumption is that there would be a fi re sale if the asset were put on the market this assumption is that there would be a fi re sale if the asset were put on the market before the second period. If the wastage rate is greater than the capital cushion, before the second period. If the wastage rate is greater than the capital cushion, then there will not be enough assets to repay depositors completely. then there will not be enough assets to repay depositors completely.
Second, the contract is such that depositors can withdraw their funds at any Second, the contract is such that depositors can withdraw their funds at any time and be paid off 100 cents to the dollar unless the intermediary has run out of time and be paid off 100 cents to the dollar unless the intermediary has run out of funds, at which point they receive nothing. funds, at which point they receive nothing.
These assumptions are suffi cient to deliver Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) best-These assumptions are suffi cient to deliver Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) bestknown result. If depositors fear that the asset would produce a signifi cant loss when known result. If depositors fear that the asset would produce a signifi cant loss when held to the second period and the loss will exceed the capital buffer ( held to the second period and the loss will exceed the capital buffer (r will be will be below -below -k), then they should rush to withdraw their funds in the fi rst period. Because ), then they should rush to withdraw their funds in the fi rst period. Because of the wastage from the early termination of the investment project, only the fi rst of the wastage from the early termination of the investment project, only the fi rst (1 (1 + + k --w) share of depositors will be repaid. Even a depositor who did not believe ) share of depositors will be repaid. Even a depositor who did not believe that there would be a capital loss from the project should rush to withdraw if it that there would be a capital loss from the project should rush to withdraw if it were feared that other depositors would begin to queue up. An institution that was were feared that other depositors would begin to queue up. An institution that was solvent, but illiquid, may fail in a depositor run. solvent, but illiquid, may fail in a depositor run.
The government can step in and protect against a self-fulfi lling and suboptimal The government can step in and protect against a self-fulfi lling and suboptimal run by insuring deposit funds. With no advantage to queuing early, no one will get in run by insuring deposit funds. With no advantage to queuing early, no one will get in line. This outcome is close to a free lunch: that is, the assurance of the government line. This outcome is close to a free lunch: that is, the assurance of the government avoids losses that would arise in a run without requiring any outlay. Treasury Secretary avoids losses that would arise in a run without requiring any outlay. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson offered a colloquial characterization of this view in giving the rationale Hank Paulson offered a colloquial characterization of this view in giving the rationale for legislation to aid the government-sponsored enterprises. He explained that the for legislation to aid the government-sponsored enterprises. He explained that the ability to write a check in support would restore confi dence in Fannie Mae and Freddie ability to write a check in support would restore confi dence in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac so that no check would ever have to be cut. As Paulson (2010) put it, the Congress Mac so that no check would ever have to be cut. As Paulson (2010) put it, the Congress would be giving him a bazooka that he would never have to take out of his pocket. would be giving him a bazooka that he would never have to take out of his pocket.
This message was especially evocative at several times during 2008. According This message was especially evocative at several times during 2008. According to fi nancial authorities, markets had herded on a pessimistic outcome, and govern-to fi nancial authorities, markets had herded on a pessimistic outcome, and government reassurances of fundamental values could steer investors back toward liquidity ment reassurances of fundamental values could steer investors back toward liquidity and solvency of key fi nancial institutions. and solvency of key fi nancial institutions.
Four Cautions Four Cautions
Economic models are useful because in laying out the assumptions behind a Economic models are useful because in laying out the assumptions behind a certain result, they also offer a set of cautions about what might happen if those certain result, they also offer a set of cautions about what might happen if those assumptions do not hold. In particular, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggest four assumptions do not hold. In particular, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggest four cautions that are especially relevant in thinking about the potential role for govern-cautions that are especially relevant in thinking about the potential role for government intervention in a fi nancial crisis. ment intervention in a fi nancial crisis.
First, First, insolvency does happen. Sometimes paranoids are right to be suspicious. If . Sometimes paranoids are right to be suspicious. If an adverse technology shock signifi cantly impaired the expected value of the invest-an adverse technology shock signifi cantly impaired the expected value of the investment or a current-period shock effectively raised the demand for cash relative to the ment or a current-period shock effectively raised the demand for cash relative to the deposit, depositors would want the early return of funds. If the government protects deposit, depositors would want the early return of funds. If the government protects deposits in a situation of insolvency, it will have to make up the difference between deposits in a situation of insolvency, it will have to make up the difference between the value of intermediaries' assets and the deposit repayments. the value of intermediaries' assets and the deposit repayments.
Second, Second, runs are about total resources. In the Diamond-Dybvig world, the . In the Diamond-Dybvig world, the possibility of being shut out if late in line creates an incentive to move early. That possibility of being shut out if late in line creates an incentive to move early. That incentive would still exist under deposit insurance, if there were doubts about the incentive would still exist under deposit insurance, if there were doubts about the government's credibility. That is, any question in markets about the government's government's credibility. That is, any question in markets about the government's willingness to commit suffi cient resources will undercut the confi dence in the willingness to commit suffi cient resources will undercut the confi dence in the pledge and keep open the possibility of self-fulfi lling runs.
pledge and keep open the possibility of self-fulfi lling runs.
Third, Third, the repayment schedule matters. Runs result because the place in line . Runs result because the place in line matters-100 cents on the dollar if early, zero if late. If repayment at a time of stress matters-100 cents on the dollar if early, zero if late. If repayment at a time of stress were proportional to total resources, position in the line would not matter and self-were proportional to total resources, position in the line would not matter and selffulfi lling tests of the government's resolve would be ruled out. fulfi lling tests of the government's resolve would be ruled out.
Fourth, Fourth, public protection changes private behavior. If the government protects . If the government protects depositors, the intermediaries lose any reason to search among potential inter-depositors, the intermediaries lose any reason to search among potential intermediaries for those that seek out more assured investment projects. Similarly, the mediaries for those that seek out more assured investment projects. Similarly, the management of investment projects downplay the possibility that they will be called management of investment projects downplay the possibility that they will be called in early. The twisting of various incentives falls under the rubric of moral hazard. in early. The twisting of various incentives falls under the rubric of moral hazard.
As Put into Practice As Put into Practice
Financial authorities in 2008 quickly gravitated to the headline result from Financial authorities in 2008 quickly gravitated to the headline result from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) while simultaneously acting in a way to hit important Diamond and Dybvig (1983) while simultaneously acting in a way to hit important tripwires of the complete model. A mapping from theory to practice in the resolu-tripwires of the complete model. A mapping from theory to practice in the resolution of Bear Stearns suggests how intervention can go wrong. tion of Bear Stearns suggests how intervention can go wrong.
Most fundamentally, the events of 2008 showed the diffi culty of putting Most fundamentally, the events of 2008 showed the diffi culty of putting Bagehot's dictum into practice. The line between illiquidity and insolvency is only Bagehot's dictum into practice. The line between illiquidity and insolvency is only indistinctly sketched for a trading fi rm having a sizable share of its assets valued indistinctly sketched for a trading fi rm having a sizable share of its assets valued at what the market will bear. The signifi cant drop in asset values over the course at what the market will bear. The signifi cant drop in asset values over the course of 2007 and 2008 was interpreted by senior offi cials as evidence of an irrational of 2007 and 2008 was interpreted by senior offi cials as evidence of an irrational withdrawal from trading or a "fi re sale" (as in Bernanke, 2008a , Geithner, 2008 withdrawal from trading or a "fi re sale" (as in Bernanke, 2008a , Geithner, 2008 , and Paulson, 2010 . But Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2008) , in a paper and Paulson, 2010) . But Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2008) , in a paper circulated before the events surrounding Bear Stearns, reported that key fi nancial circulated before the events surrounding Bear Stearns, reported that key fi nancial market prices in the unfolding subprime crisis were following the tracks of 15 market prices in the unfolding subprime crisis were following the tracks of 15 prior systemic fi nancial crises of the twentieth century. Using the same systemic prior systemic fi nancial crises of the twentieth century. Using the same systemic crises and pre-2008 data, in Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) , Carmen Reinhart crises and pre-2008 data, in Reinhart and , Carmen Reinhart and I sketched out the persistence of asset price declines and poor economic and I sketched out the persistence of asset price declines and poor economic performance. For the worst 15 crises of the twentieth century, growth of output performance. For the worst 15 crises of the twentieth century, growth of output per capita averaged 1½ percentage points slower for the decade after the crisis per capita averaged 1½ percentage points slower for the decade after the crisis than the decade prior to the crisis; equity prices fell three years running around than the decade prior to the crisis; equity prices fell three years running around the peak, and real house prices only stopped dropping six years after their peak. the peak, and real house prices only stopped dropping six years after their peak. Mimicking the mix evident in the data would prove toxic to many mortgages and Mimicking the mix evident in the data would prove toxic to many mortgages and mortgage-related securities. Thus, policymakers in 2008 who believed that there mortgage-related securities. Thus, policymakers in 2008 who believed that there was intrinsic value remaining on the balance sheet of Bear Stearns either were was intrinsic value remaining on the balance sheet of Bear Stearns either were denying those lessons of history or had not yet accepted that fi nancial markets denying those lessons of history or had not yet accepted that fi nancial markets and institutions were in a severe crisis. and institutions were in a severe crisis.
The Corps of Financial Engineers may have, nonetheless, believed that it was The Corps of Financial Engineers may have, nonetheless, believed that it was important to arrest an adverse market dynamic driven by outsized pessimism. But important to arrest an adverse market dynamic driven by outsized pessimism. But such interventions, however well-intentioned, do not necessarily change expecta-such interventions, however well-intentioned, do not necessarily change expectations in a benefi cial direction. When the Fed took such a highly innovative and tions in a benefi cial direction. When the Fed took such a highly innovative and somewhat dubious approach to subsidizing the takeover of Bear Stearns by JPMC, somewhat dubious approach to subsidizing the takeover of Bear Stearns by JPMC, the Fed took on credit risk and cut across the pre-existing boundary between the Fed took on credit risk and cut across the pre-existing boundary between monetary and fi scal policies. Moreover, these decisions were made by unelected monetary and fi scal policies. Moreover, these decisions were made by unelected offi cials with access to the considerable potential balance-sheet expansion avail-offi cials with access to the considerable potential balance-sheet expansion available only to the central bank. As a consequence, authorities signaled to market able only to the central bank. As a consequence, authorities signaled to market participants, to the public, and to Congress that there was substantial capacity for participants, to the public, and to Congress that there was substantial capacity for more intervention in the future. more intervention in the future.
For creditors, the result of this intervention is that they were doubly rewarded. For creditors, the result of this intervention is that they were doubly rewarded. When they originally invested, they had received compensation for the risk of partial When they originally invested, they had received compensation for the risk of partial repayment in the form of a spread of the private credit rate over the risk-free rate, repayment in the form of a spread of the private credit rate over the risk-free rate, but then when those risks materialized, the government made them whole. but then when those risks materialized, the government made them whole.
Worse, the form of the Bear Stearns resolution actually invited another form Worse, the form of the Bear Stearns resolution actually invited another form of speculative attack. The offi cial playbook appeared to protect creditors fully of speculative attack. The offi cial playbook appeared to protect creditors fully and to wipe out shareholders. This expectation made it profi table to identify and to wipe out shareholders. This expectation made it profi table to identify the next fi nancial fi rm to be resolved and then to sell its stock short and use the the next fi nancial fi rm to be resolved and then to sell its stock short and use the proceeds to purchase its unsecured debt. If the candidate fi rm was identifi ed proceeds to purchase its unsecured debt. If the candidate fi rm was identifi ed correctly, the debt would appreciate in value and its stock collapse. The basic correctly, the debt would appreciate in value and its stock collapse. The basic message is that repaying unsecured creditors at par creates an opportunity for message is that repaying unsecured creditors at par creates an opportunity for capital gain. When the government creates an expectation that it will intervene capital gain. When the government creates an expectation that it will intervene in this way, market participants bring forward the pressures offi cials fear in a in this way, market participants bring forward the pressures offi cials fear in a classic speculative attack. classic speculative attack.
It might be argued that full repayment of the Bear Stearns creditors lowered the It might be argued that full repayment of the Bear Stearns creditors lowered the likelihood that creditors might run on other similarly situated entities (for example, likelihood that creditors might run on other similarly situated entities (for example, Calvo and Mendoza, 2000) . However, repaying creditors at par to prevent runs only Calvo and Mendoza, 2000) . However, repaying creditors at par to prevent runs only works as long as everyone can be repaid at par. The overall economic loss across the works as long as everyone can be repaid at par. The overall economic loss across the fi nancial sector was already expected to be patently too large for unelected offi cials fi nancial sector was already expected to be patently too large for unelected offi cials to make such a credible promise. For example, the International Monetary Fund's to make such a credible promise. For example, the International Monetary Fund 's Global Financial Stability Report (2008a, b) had put the capital loss worldwide at $1¼ tril-(2008a, b) had put the capital loss worldwide at $1¼ trillion. The Bear Stearns bailout would only stop credit runs at other institutions if the lion. The Bear Stearns bailout would only stop credit runs at other institutions if the authorities signaled that they would backstop all uninsured creditors-which would authorities signaled that they would backstop all uninsured creditors-which would effectively need to be a promise to fi ll the capital hole on intermediary balance sheets effectively need to be a promise to fi ll the capital hole on intermediary balance sheets caused by the destruction of economic value in the housing bust. caused by the destruction of economic value in the housing bust.
For high-level managers at other fi nancial fi rms, the Bear Stearns deal suggested For high-level managers at other fi nancial fi rms, the Bear Stearns deal suggested that rather than address the problematic assets on its balance sheet, it was time to that rather than address the problematic assets on its balance sheet, it was time to start planning in terms of the possibility for future federal assistance. An instructive start planning in terms of the possibility for future federal assistance. An instructive example occurred the week after the Federal Reserve lent to Bear Stearns and created example occurred the week after the Federal Reserve lent to Bear Stearns and created the Primary Dealer Credit Facility as a mechanism for extending liquidity to major the Primary Dealer Credit Facility as a mechanism for extending liquidity to major investment banks. Lehman Brothers soon issued a structured note, in which it rolled investment banks. Lehman Brothers soon issued a structured note, in which it rolled together the bits and pieces of complicated products it had on its cutting room fl oor, together the bits and pieces of complicated products it had on its cutting room fl oor, to create a new security. The only evident economic purpose of that new security was to create a new security. The only evident economic purpose of that new security was that it was structured so it would be eligible for collateral for the Federal Reserve's new that it was structured so it would be eligible for collateral for the Federal Reserve's new lending window. The private sector learned from the Bear Stearns intervention that lending window. The private sector learned from the Bear Stearns intervention that management had more time to raise capital and address balance sheet problems and management had more time to raise capital and address balance sheet problems and creditors did not have to exert as much counterparty discipline. creditors did not have to exert as much counterparty discipline.
For the public and the political class, the Bear Stearns intervention in For the public and the political class, the Bear Stearns intervention in March 2008 showed that the Federal Reserve balance sheet could be used for March 2008 showed that the Federal Reserve balance sheet could be used for other purposes. The rank-and-fi le citizen saw support given to the powerful and other purposes. The rank-and-fi le citizen saw support given to the powerful and connected in an obscure and poorly explained fashion by unelected technicians. connected in an obscure and poorly explained fashion by unelected technicians. The fi nancial elite saw those unelected technicians in a more accommodating light The fi nancial elite saw those unelected technicians in a more accommodating light than experience had suggested. In particular, in September 1998, the funding than experience had suggested. In particular, in September 1998, the funding problems of the levered hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) problems of the levered hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) roiled markets, and offi cials at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York called the roiled markets, and offi cials at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York called the leaders of the fi nancial industry into a meeting where they were asked to solve their leaders of the fi nancial industry into a meeting where they were asked to solve their own problems among themselves. Ten years later, after the Bear Stearns interven-own problems among themselves. Ten years later, after the Bear Stearns intervention, any discussion among market participants with Fed interlocutors would begin tion, any discussion among market participants with Fed interlocutors would begin with the presumption that offi cial support would be forthcoming and it was only a with the presumption that offi cial support would be forthcoming and it was only a question of how much. question of how much.
For the political class, the Fed's action in the Bear Stearns' resolution set the For the political class, the Fed's action in the Bear Stearns' resolution set the precedent that large creditors should be protected and that resolutions would be precedent that large creditors should be protected and that resolutions would be found for the small circle of large and connected fi rms. Of course, this process is found for the small circle of large and connected fi rms. Of course, this process is open to political pressures. Why was one fi rm helped and not another? Is this a new open to political pressures. Why was one fi rm helped and not another? Is this a new lever of policy? Should Congress be involved? In the models of institution design lever of policy? Should Congress be involved? In the models of institution design reviewed in Dixit (1998) , government agencies are only imperfectly monitored by reviewed in Dixit (1998) , government agencies are only imperfectly monitored by the elected offi cials who created them. Expanding the tools and number of missions the elected offi cials who created them. Expanding the tools and number of missions for an agency, like the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Treasury, invites pressure from for an agency, like the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Treasury, invites pressure from the outside and tradeoff among goals from the inside. the outside and tradeoff among goals from the inside.
Those tradeoffs were clearly evident in the problems that offi cials had in Those tradeoffs were clearly evident in the problems that offi cials had in communicating their actions. Public offi cials were effectively pulled by two opposite communicating their actions. Public offi cials were effectively pulled by two opposite poles in slanting their public statements. Early in 2008, they had a desire to reassure poles in slanting their public statements. Early in 2008, they had a desire to reassure investors so as to ease what they viewed to be a self-fulfi lling crisis of confi dence. investors so as to ease what they viewed to be a self-fulfi lling crisis of confi dence. Later in 2008, they had to emphasize fi nancial fragilities to stiffen the spines of Later in 2008, they had to emphasize fi nancial fragilities to stiffen the spines of elected offi cials considering remedial legislation. elected offi cials considering remedial legislation.
In short, the bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008 wasted an educable In short, the bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008 wasted an educable moment. It was an opportunity for creditors, fi nancial fi rms, the public, and elected moment. It was an opportunity for creditors, fi nancial fi rms, the public, and elected representatives to appreciate that the nation had too much debt secured by too representatives to appreciate that the nation had too much debt secured by too many overvalued houses. When the Federal Reserve stepped in, incentives changed, many overvalued houses. When the Federal Reserve stepped in, incentives changed, and all parties were given an opportunity to delay dealing with the problem. and all parties were given an opportunity to delay dealing with the problem.
The Road Not Taken The Road Not Taken
The government's aid in March 2008 in the resolution of Bear Stearns rewrote The government's aid in March 2008 in the resolution of Bear Stearns rewrote the fi nancial and political landscape. Six months later, another levered speculative the fi nancial and political landscape. Six months later, another levered speculative entity that had profi ted from the building boom failed. But focusing on Lehman entity that had profi ted from the building boom failed. But focusing on Lehman Brothers as the trigger for the fi nancial crisis misrepresents the chain of events. Brothers as the trigger for the fi nancial crisis misrepresents the chain of events. Prior actions by policymakers made Lehman loom larger than it ever should have. Prior actions by policymakers made Lehman loom larger than it ever should have. Lending to Bear Stearns put a spark to the notion that many institutions were too Lending to Bear Stearns put a spark to the notion that many institutions were too big or too interconnected to fail. big or too interconnected to fail. 6 6 As the crisis wore on through 2008 and the bail-As the crisis wore on through 2008 and the bailout tab increased, appointed offi cials recognized the need to get the approval of the out tab increased, appointed offi cials recognized the need to get the approval of the Congress. Because the political system does not get into gear easily, that required Congress. Because the political system does not get into gear easily, that required that these offi cials would eventually have to say "no" to someone, sometime. The that these offi cials would eventually have to say "no" to someone, sometime. The Corps of Financial Engineers drew the line at Lehman. They might have been able Corps of Financial Engineers drew the line at Lehman. They might have been able to let the process run a few weeks more and let the bill get bigger, but ultimately to let the process run a few weeks more and let the bill get bigger, but ultimately they would have had to stop. And when they did, expectations would be dashed and they would have had to stop. And when they did, expectations would be dashed and markets would adjust. If Lehman had been saved, someone else would have been markets would adjust. If Lehman had been saved, someone else would have been allowed to fail. The only consequence would be the date when we commemorate the allowed to fail. The only consequence would be the date when we commemorate the anniversary of the fi nancial crisis, not that a crisis would have been forever averted. anniversary of the fi nancial crisis, not that a crisis would have been forever averted.
Although I have emphasized the Bear Stearns intervention as by far the most Although I have emphasized the Bear Stearns intervention as by far the most prominent example of an intervention that altered expectations in one direction, prominent example of an intervention that altered expectations in one direction, and then Lehman's bankruptcy as the nonintervention that shocked the fi nancial and then Lehman's bankruptcy as the nonintervention that shocked the fi nancial system, the real-world story is of course more complex. The belief that the govern-system, the real-world story is of course more complex. The belief that the government was committed to intervening in troubled fi nancial institutions and protecting that fi rm was taken over by Citibank. At the same time, different regulators required that fi rm was taken over by Citibank. At the same time, different regulators required haircuts for the facilitated takeover of Washington Mutual by JPMC. Lehman not haircuts for the facilitated takeover of Washington Mutual by JPMC. Lehman not only changed the presumptions, it seemed to scramble the idea that any consistent only changed the presumptions, it seemed to scramble the idea that any consistent presumption was possible. Moreover, late in September 2008 as government offi -presumption was possible. Moreover, late in September 2008 as government officials tried to build support for Congressional legislation to fund the TARP bailout cials tried to build support for Congressional legislation to fund the TARP bailout legislation, they conveyed that they viewed the fi nancial situation as dire, in a way legislation, they conveyed that they viewed the fi nancial situation as dire, in a way that seriously damaged the confi dence of fi nancial markets. that seriously damaged the confi dence of fi nancial markets.
Consider the alternative had offi cials from the Federal Reserve not lent to Bear Consider the alternative had offi cials from the Federal Reserve not lent to Bear Stearns. That is, imagine that the Corps of Financial Engineers had held a princi-Stearns. That is, imagine that the Corps of Financial Engineers had held a principled line in early March 2008 or, even better, imagine if they and their predecessors pled line in early March 2008 or, even better, imagine if they and their predecessors had acted consistently in not making private losses a public responsibility for many had acted consistently in not making private losses a public responsibility for many years before. The Federal Reserve could have then extended credit to any fi nancial years before. The Federal Reserve could have then extended credit to any fi nancial institution willing to lift out the position of the defunct Bear Stearns to insure that institution willing to lift out the position of the defunct Bear Stearns to insure that the fi nancial system continued to function smoothly. At the same time, showing its the fi nancial system continued to function smoothly. At the same time, showing its ingenuity in a different form, the Fed could have begun purchasing the debt of the ingenuity in a different form, the Fed could have begun purchasing the debt of the government-sponsored enterprises and, more importantly, their mortgage-backed government-sponsored enterprises and, more importantly, their mortgage-backed securities. The evident support to the prices of mortgage-related securities would securities. The evident support to the prices of mortgage-related securities would have cushioned the market blow of Bear Stearns' failure, preventing a destructive have cushioned the market blow of Bear Stearns' failure, preventing a destructive fi re sale of assets at temporarily depressed prices. fi re sale of assets at temporarily depressed prices.
True, a Federal Reserve that extended credit to another fi rm that took over True, a Federal Reserve that extended credit to another fi rm that took over the Bear Stearns positions would be exposed to credit risk, as it is now. And public the Bear Stearns positions would be exposed to credit risk, as it is now. And public resources would no doubt have been needed to fi ll the hole blown through fi nan-resources would no doubt have been needed to fi ll the hole blown through fi nancial intermediaries balance sheets by mortgage-related losses. But elected offi cials cial intermediaries balance sheets by mortgage-related losses. But elected offi cials would have been involved sooner as the crisis came to a quicker boiling point. With would have been involved sooner as the crisis came to a quicker boiling point. With the legislature, rather than unelected technicians, directing decisions, the process the legislature, rather than unelected technicians, directing decisions, the process would have been more transparent, if not necessarily more effi cient. But the nation would have been more transparent, if not necessarily more effi cient. But the nation as a whole would have come to terms sooner with the wealth loss associated with the as a whole would have come to terms sooner with the wealth loss associated with the bursting of the housing bubble. bursting of the housing bubble.
Most importantly, a more disciplined precedent would have been set that Most importantly, a more disciplined precedent would have been set that yielded long-term benefi ts. The failure of Bear Stearns would have provided a useful yielded long-term benefi ts. The failure of Bear Stearns would have provided a useful encouragement to those fi rms in the core of our fi nancial system to get more capital, encouragement to those fi rms in the core of our fi nancial system to get more capital, and to creditors and counterparties to pay closer attention, and to the public and and to creditors and counterparties to pay closer attention, and to the public and politicians to realize that limits had been reached. The deeper lesson is that while politicians to realize that limits had been reached. The deeper lesson is that while rescuing fi rms in distress almost always seems attractive at the time, such decisions rescuing fi rms in distress almost always seems attractive at the time, such decisions can set the stage for long-lasting effects that are far more consequential than their can set the stage for long-lasting effects that are far more consequential than their immediate costs. immediate costs. ■ I appreciate the comments of Ken Rogoff, Carmen Reinhart, and the editors of this journal, David Autor, Chad Jones, John List, and Timothy Taylor. Adam Paul, Rohan Poojara, and Christopher Reilly provided excellent research assistance.
